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Different and more or less conflicting systems of law, different
and more or less competing systems of jurisdiction, in one and
the same region, are compatible with a high state of civilization,
with a strong government, and with an administration of justice
well enough liked and sufficiently understood by those who are
concerned. 1
INTRODUCTION

States are increasingly delegating or transferring powers to interna
tional organizations,2 and international organizations are increasingly
pushing the limits of the powers conferred upon them. This expansion
of powers embraces all areas of international authority-particularly
lawmaking and adjudication. 3 Recognizing that international organiza
tions have gained this greater role, scholars have begun to think more
deeply about the legitimacy, accountability, and good governance of in
ternational organizations,4 and States (as well as non-State entities, such
I. S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I xxiii, XCV (2d ed. reissued
1968) (1898), cited in Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1587 n.169 (2003).
2. See generally DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF
SOVEREIGN POWERS (2005). On the constitutionality in the United States of delegations to inter
national organizations, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitu
tion, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Thomas M. Franck, Can the United
States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International Regimes?, in DELEGATING STATE
POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY I (Thomas M.
Franck ed., 2000); David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation
of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 71 (2000); and Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1492 {2004).
3. See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
(2005).
4. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal
lenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999); Allison Marston
Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the Interna
tional Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510 (2003); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Thomas M.
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); Ruth W. Grant &
Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 29 (2005); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379
(1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Ad
ministrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 68 I (1996--
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as the European Union 5 and nongovernmental organizations), knowing
what6 is at stake, have become more forthright in seeking a seat at the table.
As the powers of international organizations have expanded, the need
to maintain control of international organizations has also grown. "Control" means checks on the powers of an organization that ensure that the
organization acts within its assigned mandate.7 Controls, such as the
checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution, are necessary in any system of limited powers. Without them, restrictions, as they appear in an
organization's charter, are liable to disappear, and the organization is
likely to take actions either in violation of its allocated authority (the
claims of ultra vires and excks de pouvoir)8 or for a purpose for which
that authority was not granted (the claim of dtournement de pouvoir).9
Depending on their content, such actions could jeopardize the legitimacy of the organization and, conceivably, its very existence. Controls,
therefore, are crucial to the successful operation of an international organization; they have greater importance the greater the power given to
the organization. This is true whether the international organization (or
one of its components) exercises political, legislative, administrative, or
judicial functions.
But control is not everything. International organizations need a certain degree of independence in order to accomplish their tasks, and, indeed, that is assumed by the States that create them.10 Independence-in
the forms of autonomy and neutrality-can "enhanc[e] the efficiency
and legitimacy of collective and individual actions."" The assumption
1997).
5. On the European Union and European Community's attempts to become more active in international fora-and, occasionally, to supplant the roles of its member states-see, for example,
Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources ofInternationalLaw, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 155-61 (2005).
6. Cf John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 511, 604 (2000) ("[T]here is a sad dilemma at the heart of all constitutions: the more wealth
a regime creates, the greater the incentives for interest groups to distort the system to their advantage."); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991) (noting
how "the closure of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice").
7. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 1 (1992).

8. See id. at 6.
9. See generally J.E.S. Fawcett, Ddtoumement de Pouvoir by InternationalOrganizations,33
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1957).

10. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through FormalInternational
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 16-23 (1998).
11. Id.at 16; see also Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, The Independence ofInter-
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of independence is particularly true for international courts, which, like
their domestic counterparts, require independence as a prerequisite of
their legitimacy and the successful fulfillment of their responsibilities. 12
A tension between independence and control is inherent in all forms
of international delegation, but no more so than with delegation to inter
national courts. 13 Courts are accorded independence on the condition
that there are sufficient effective controls in place, and controls are tai
lored so as not to impede too greatly on judicial independence. In some
highly developed domestic legal systems, such as the United States, 14
the controls are so finely tuned and trusted that courts are allowed pow
ers, in some instances, to negate the acts of other governmental entities
(judicial review of legislative and administrative acts) or to develop the
law on their own (common-law-making). 15 In less developed systems,
such as international law, courts do not have such expansive authori
ties, 16 but their impact is no less great and their role is no less important.
International law scholars have argued recently that we need not
worry about the potential excesses of international courts-and particu
larly international judicial lawmaking-because existing controls effec
tively keep courts in check. 17 Described variously as "bounded discrenational Organizations: Concept and Application, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 253,256 (2006).
12. See Edward Gordon et al.,The Independence and Impartiality ofInternational Judges, 83
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 508 (1989); Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts
and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271 (2003);
Symposium, The Independence and Accountability of the International Judge, 2 LAW & PRAC.
INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 3 (2003). See generally Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and
Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (2005).
13. Cf Jonas Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What
Consequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 23, 28 (2002) ("What truly makes delegation a dilemma is the

fact that its very rationale may prevent government principals from establishing effective control
mechanisms.").
14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1251-53 (I 984) (describ
ing the external and internal constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court); Barry Friedman,Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,679 (1993) (concluding that U.S. "[j]udges are con
strained by the political system that surrounds them").
15. Of course, the exercise of such authorities by courts in even the most developed legal sys
tems is controversial in particular cases and is rejected by some categorically.
16. See Joel P. Trachtrnan, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J.
333,347 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 V AND. L. REV. I (2006); Tom Ginsburg,
Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 63I (2005); Laur
ence R. Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained Independ
ence, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 253 (Stefan Voigt, Max Albert & Dieter
Schmidtchen eds., 2006); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create Inter-
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tion" 18 or "constrained independence," 19 these scholars assert that inter
national courts operate in a "strategic space" in which "the political
constraint is operating effectively."2° Consequently, to the extent any
judicial lawmaking or innovation has occurred, it has been tacitly ap
proved of by the relevant States, which therefore removes any questions
about its legitimacy.21
This Essay takes issue with this assumption that controls on interna
tional courts are sufficient and effective. To the contrary, existing con
trols over international courts are, in practice, relatively weak. Because
of structural constraints on international lawmaking and the intricacies
of international politics and diplomacy,22 States generally lack the abil
ity to correct interpretive errors made by courts, and because of the
principle of judicial independence, States are unable to direct judges to
decide cases in certain ways or otherwise control the substance ofjudi
cial decisions. Judges, for their part, naturally have their own interests
and are tempted and encouraged to depart from their limited roles in or
der to expand their own and their courts' authorities. Internal controls
are, thus, relatively weak as well. This is not to say, certainly, that exist
ing controls do not sometimes work or that judges seldom rule in accor
dance with law. It is simply to point out that controls are not as effective
as they are purported to be.
Because States have no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of in
ternational courts and because States have the ability not to comply with
judicial decisions, the weaknesses ofjudicial controls means that States
are more likely to avoid courts, abandon them, or disregard their deci
sions, potentially condemning courts to irrelevance. In order to preserve
and strengthen international courts, we need to think anew about how
best to maintain control over them.
national Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 942-54
(2005); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247,249 (2004); cf Mike Burstein, The Will to Enforce:
An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court of Human Rights, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 423 (2006); William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Exceeded Its Authority?: A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Gov
ernment Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79 (2001).
18. Ginsburg, supra note 17.
19. Helfer, supra note 17, at 253; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 942-54.
20. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 249.
21. See Danner, supra note 17, at 4.
22. Cf Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-contracting
Political Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren
G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
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The answer is not, as some have suggested, for States to exert greater
direct control over international judges.2 3 As others have pointed out,
international courts with independent judges serve useful purposes for
States by, among other things, 24 "enhanc[ing] the credibility of international commitments," 25 thereby ensuring the relevant "[legal] regime's
perceived legitimacy and continued operation.', 26 More State control
over judges would consequently be counterproductive. The greater the
direct control over judges by States the lesser the utility of those judges
and their courts to States.
Instead, this Essay argues that the increasing competition among international courts that has resulted from their recent proliferation 27 has
and will continue to more effectively constrain international judicial
power and, as a result, increase the likelihood that States will recognize
and accede to international judicial authority. Competition among courts
may also lead to better-and perhaps convergent-decisions over the
long-term. Though some have acknowledged in passing the possible
benefits of competition among courts for norm-development, 28 no one
23. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependencein InternationalTribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
24. Other reasons for delegating authority to international courts include efficiency, expertise,
domestic politics, mimicry, and blame shifting. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 22, at 329; Rachel
Brewster, Rule-Based DisputeResolution in InternationalTrade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006);
Tallberg, supra note 13, at 26-27. There are also, of course, reasons for not delegating authority
to international courts or for limiting such authority. See, e.g., David P. Forsythe, The InternationalCourt of Justice at Fifty, in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER
FIFTY YEARS 385, 398 (A.S. Muller, D. Rai6 & J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997); Joel P. Trachtman,
Book Note, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 858, 860 (2004) (reviewing JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)).
25. Helfer & Slaughter, supranote 17, at 904; see also id. at 931-36.
26. Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1720, 1768 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)).
27. There is, by now, a substantial literature on the proliferation of international courts. In addition to pieces cited elsewhere in this Essay, see also Symposium, The ProliferationofInternational Tribunals: Piercing Together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); and
Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in InternationalLaw, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 845 (2004).
28. See Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of InternationalDisputes in Practice,7 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 257, 276 (1995); Thomas Buergenthal, The ProliferationofDisputes, Dispute Settlement Proceduresand Respectfor the Rule of Law, 22 ARB. INT'L 495, 497 (2006) [hereinafter
Buergenthal, Proliferation of Disputes]; Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International
Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 274 (2001) [hereinafter
Buergenthal, Proliferationof InternationalCourts]; William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 977 (2004); Jonathan 1.Charney, Is InternationalLaw
Threatenedby Multiple InternationalTribunals?,271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 354, 361 (1998);
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has provided a comprehensive argument in its favor, linked competition
with control, or offered a defense against competition's critics who
claim, as Gilbert Guillaume, former judge and president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), recently did, that "[t]he law of the market... cannot be the law of justice. 29
Part I explains why effective controls are necessary for international
adjudication. Part II argues that States, with minor exceptions, currently
do not have effective mechanisms to control international courts once
those courts have been established. Part III looks at internal control
mechanisms and asks whether judges can effectively control their own
interests in expanding the powers of their courts. Part IV contends that
the international legal system, as it is presently constituted, is wellsuited to competitive adjudication, that such competition can provide an
effective judicial control mechanism, and that, on balance, this and
other characteristics of competition enhance international dispute resolution. To this end, the Essay concludes with an argument against "system-protective ' 30 judicial devices such as inter-court deference, and in
favor of the establishment of "competition-friendly" procedures.

Fausto Pocar, The Proliferationof InternationalCriminalCourts and Tribunals: A Necessity in
the CurrentInternationalCommunity, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 304, 307 (2004).
29. Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of Proliferation:A Blueprintfor Action, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 300, 301 (2004); see also, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 127 (2003); Gilbert Guillaume, The

Future of InternationalJudicial Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 862 (1995) ("New
courts or tribunals should be created only when necessary. Moreover, one may wonder whether a
mechanism could not be devised to avoid divergences of case law."); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards
an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, Int'l Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United
Nations: The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal
Order
(Oct.
27,
2000),
http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=-3&p 1 1&p2=3&p3 = 1.
30. Martinez, supranote 29, at 448.
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CONSENT AND CONTROL

International adjudication is still a consent-based system. 3 1 States are

under no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of an international
court, and even when they do, they reflect the limits of their consent in
the terms of the court's mandate or (if permitted) in the terms of their
accession to it. 32 Such limits can stipulate the court's subject matter ju-

risdiction 33 and any other preconditions on its exercise. The mandates
may also limit the court's procedures, what law the court may apply,
and what remedies it may impose.3 4
Like all organizations with limited mandates, restrictions on interna-

tional courts would be meaningless without effective control mechanisms. Controls are common in all successful national constitutional
systems. The system of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution is

the most obvious example. Controls can be in the original document
laying out the institution's mandate or evolve over time. They can take
on a variety of forms. They can be exercised by coequal structures-for
example, separate branches of government-or hierarchically, such as

by a higher court over a lower court. They can be formal or informal.
They can be direct or indirect. They can be internal or external. Internal
controls are those exercised by the institution itself They are, in other
words, methods of self-control. External controls, by contrast, are those
effected by outside bodies.

31. Consent, clearly, is more complicated with regard to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were founded not on individual State consent but the consent
of a group of States by decision of the Security Council. As I discuss below, see infra Section
IV.B, the meaning of consent can also be attenuated when international adjudication is an integral
component of a larger diplomatic bargain. Even so, the argument, made by some, that international adjudication is moving (or has moved) from a consensual to a compulsory system is, I believe, exaggerated. See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shiftfrom the Consensualto the Compulsory Paradigmin InternationalAdjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 791 (2007).
32. This discussion is based in part on REISMAN, supra note 7, at 1-3; and W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourtof Justice: InternationalArbitration
and InternationalAdjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 28-37 (1996). See also Laurence R.
Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-NationalSystems: The Case of the Uniform DomainName DisputeResolution Policy,43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141, 188-236 (2001).
33. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans
1179, 59 Stat. 1031; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544, availableat http://www.un.orglaw/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
34. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supranote 33, art. 38.
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Not all control systems are created equal though. Some are more targeted than others; some are more effective than others; and some are
more desirable than others. Internal controls are more efficient because
they eliminate or reduce the costs of correction by external agents, but
most legal systems, including international law, contain a complicated
and intertwined combination of internal and external controls in order to
reduce the risk of control failure and to ensure optimal control effect.
However constructed, controls provide States the comfort they seek
at the moment of consent that an international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate, and controls continue to provide States the
security they require to maintain their consent throughout a court's existence. The work controls do, in other words, is not only objective-that
is, actually establishing limits to judicial action. It is, and perhaps more
importantly, subjective-the creation of the perception that courts are
acting in accordance with their mandates. It is that perception that allows a risk-averse State to do what it need not do-consent to a court's
jurisdiction. And the failure to create such an impression (or, alternatively, the undermining of an existing positive impression) helps
weaken consent.
Simply stated, without control there would be no consent, and without consent there would be no adjudication. Thus, when controls are
removed (or perceived to be removed), consent is likely to go as well.
And when controls are weakened, so too is consent. Effective controls
are, therefore, necessary for the existence and success of international
dispute resolution. It is important, then, to understand whether there are
sufficient and effective controls on international courts, and, if not, how
they can be improved.
II.

CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS BE CONTROLLED BY STATES?

On the surface there are a multitude of ways for States to control international courts. States elect a court's judges; they set the court's
budget and appropriate funds; they specify the terms of the court's jurisdiction and write the laws that the court applies in particular cases;
and, if all else fails, they can withdraw from a court's jurisdiction. The
standard view is that these multiple mechanisms
of controlling interna35
tional courts are effective and sufficient.

35. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 17; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 17.
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But controlling an international court is not as easy as it looks, for
two reasons. First, State control of international courts is limited because courts (and their judges), as an essential component of their existence, are provided judicial independence and because the tools for the
control of courts are cumbersome and not easily employed. External
controls and their limitations-judicial independence and structural
constraints inherent to the international system-are the subjects of this
Part. Second, State control is limited because international courts, particularly their judges, are not simple puppets-courts and judges have
interests and authorities of their own, interests that occasionally differ
from those of the States that established them. This second set of reasons, which pertain to judicial self-control, is the subject of Part III.
A.

External Controlson InternationalCourts

External controls on international courts are many and various, encompassing actions both ex ante and ex post. 36 They come in five categories: (1) control over the court's mandate; (2) control over the rules
the court applies; (3) control over the court's staffing; (4) control over
the court's budget; and (5) control over a court's ability to make and
apply its decisions.
States control a court's mandate, the basic document that establishes
the court and sets the terms of the court's jurisdiction and operation.
Mandate control operates both ex ante and ex post. States, for instance,
can limit a court's jurisdiction ex ante, and if they find that the original
jurisdictional grant is flawed, they have the ability to revise the court's
mandate ex post. 37 The Security Council, for instance, has amended a
number of times the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) in order to enhance the efficiency of the courts by
increasing the number of judges available to hear cases and by adding
an additional prosecutor.38 The Council has also set out "completion
36. For a useful summary of various control mechanisms, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note
17, at 944, tbl. 3.
37. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 41, 1833
U.N.T.S.
561,
570,
available
at
http://www.itlos.org/documents_publications/documents/statute-en.pdf (providing a means for
the amendment of the Statute); Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 69
(same).
38. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1512, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1512 (Oct. 27, 2003) (ICTR); S.C. Res. 1503,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (ICTR); S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (Aug.
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strategies" for the two ad hoc criminal tribunals, which establish "target
dates ' 39 for the conclusion of investigations, trials, and "all [other]
work."40 Though the dates specified by the Council are couched in less
than binding language, the evident threat is that the courts will be shut
down, and their mandates terminated, at the close of the specified period.
States can also try to control a court through the strict drafting of applicable law ex ante, subsequent interpretation of the law, and the formal revision of that law ex post. To this end, most treaties allow for
amendment and some provide mechanisms for the parties to adopt authoritative interpretations of the agreement.
The detailed Statute, Elements of Crimes, and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence set out by the drafters of the Rome Statute and the States
Parties to the International Criminal Court demonstrate the lengths to
which States can go to limit a court's discretion ex ante.41 These documents were a deliberate attempt by their drafters to limit judicial discretion through detailed rules (as opposed to standards). 4 2 This move resulted, in part, from concerns that the crimes in the Court's Statute were
too vague, infringing on the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine
lege) and allowing for the possibility of judicial lawmaking. 4 3 It also re14, 2002) (ICTR and ICTY).
39. President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/28 (Aug. 4, 2004).
40. See S.C. Res. 1534, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503,
7,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). On the completion strategies, see Larry D. Johnson,
Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human Rights
StandardsandExcluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (2005); Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial
Effects of the "Completion Strategies" on the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal Tribunals,99 AM.
J. INT'L L. 142 (2005); and Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy:
Efforts to Achieve Accountabilityfor War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 82
(2005).
41. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/I/3 (Part II-A) (Sept. 2002);
Elements of Crimes, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP 1/3 (Part II-B) (Sept. 2002).
42. Cf Frederick Schauer, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, International
Criminal Court: Rule-Based Decision-Making in the Development of Legal Institutions in Political
Environments,
at
12-13
(May
18,
2005),
http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/Schauerpresentation.pdf (noting "the advantages of legitimacy and
transparency that come from rules far more than from discretion" and suggesting the benefits of
this approach for the international system).
43. See William K. Lietzau, InternationalCriminalLaw After Rome: Concernsfrom a US.
Military Perspective,64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 122-23 (2001); see also William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars for the International
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flected dissatisfaction with active rulemaking by ICTY and ICTR
judges. 44 Indeed, one former-ICTY judge described the Elements of
Crimes as "an overwhelming exercise in legal positivism," 45 and concluded that the "drafting of the ICC Statute and of the Elements of
Crimes illustrates clearly an intent on [the] part [of the States Parties to
the Rome Statute] to maintain control over the making of international
law and to keep a tight leash on the ability of international judges to go
beyond what [States] have agreed to." ' 46 Another former-ICTY judge
and president, referring to the ICC Statute, lamented that it "seems to
evince a certain mistrust in the Judges. 4 7
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an
example of ex post rules control. Pursuant to that agreement, the
NAFTA's Free Trade Commission (FTC), whose members are the three
NAFTA parties, has the authority to interpret provisions of NAFTA,
and the FTC's interpretations are binding on NAFTA dispute resolution
panels.48 In fact, such interpretations may effectively "overrule" interpretations given to the same provisions in earlier decisions of dispute
resolution panels. In 2001, the Commission did precisely this following
three awards interpreting a particular NAFTA provision. 49 The three
Criminal Court,32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477 (1999).
44. Article 51 of the Rome Statute provides that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to
be adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. Judges can only adopt provisional rules in "urgent
cases," which will then be reviewed by a subsequent Assembly of States Parties. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, supranote 33, art. 51(3).
45. David Hunt, The InternationalCriminal Court:High Hopes, 'CreativeAmbiguity' andan
Unfortunate Mistrust in InternationalJudges, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 56, 59 (2004).
46. Id.at61.
47. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: Some PreliminaryReflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 163 (1999); accordBoard of Editors, The Rome Statute: A Tentative Assessment, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1901, 1904 n.2 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002)
(suggesting that the detailed drafting of the ICC's Elements of Crimes was "symptomatic of
States' concern to control the Court and its judges").
48. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1131(2), 2001(2)(c), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The WTO Agreement also allows its members, by a three-fourths vote, to interpret the Agreement. See Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization art. IX:2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 159. The members have never
adopted an interpretation and only once has an interpretation been proposed. See Communication
from the European Communities to Chairman of the General Council, Requestfor an Authoritative InterpretationPursuantto Article IX2 of the MarrakeshAgreement Establishingthe World
Trade Organization,WT/GC/W/133 (Jan. 25, 1999); Communication from the European Communities to Chairman of the General Council, Request for an AuthoritativeInterpretationPursuant to Article IX2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
WT/GC/W/143 (Feb. 5, 1999).
49. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I, Award of
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NAFTA parties decided that these interpretations were incorrect, and
the FTC issued its own interpretation. 50 The FTC's interpretation was
subsequently followed by panels in The Loewen
Group, Inc. v. United
52
States5' and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada.
Another technique by which States could possibly control courts is
through judicial appointments. 53 Staffing control can take place in a

number of ways: through the establishment (or not) ofjudicial term limits; through the length of the judge's term of office; through the nomination, election, and reappointment of judges; through the granting of certain privileges and immunities to judges; and through the designation of
judicial seats for certain States, regions, or persons with particular competences and experience. 54 Presumably, States put some thought into
those who they nominate and elect to the international bench. Further, it

is assumed that judges are more likely to do a good job if they wish to
be re-appointed and that a judge who does a poor job will not be renominated or re-elected.
States might also control courts through their budgets, as courts are

entirely dependent on States and international organizations for their
funding. 55 The expenses of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for exthe
NAFTA
11
Chapter
Tribunal
30,
(Aug.
2000),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial
Award of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialawardfinal_13-11 -00.pdf; Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), availableat http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/AwardMerits-e.pdf.
50. Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 3 1,
2001), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf (interpreting NAFTA
article 1105(l)'s "minimum standard of treatment in accordance with international law" provision).
51. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of the
NAFTA
Chapter
11
Tribunal,
125-128
(June
26,
2003),
available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
52. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal in Respect of
Damages,
51
(May 31,
2002), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/documents/damageaward.pdf.
53. See generally Adam M. Smith, "JudicialNationalism" in InternationalLaw: National
Identity andJudicialAutonomy at the 1CW, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 197 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supranote 33, art. 36(5) (requiring there to be an "equivalent proportion" of judges with competences in criminal law and
procedure and in international humanitarian law and the law of human rights); id. art. 36(8) (stating the parties shall take into account in the selection of judges, inter alia, "[e]quitable geographic
representation" and a "fair representation of male and female judges").
55. See generally Thordis Ingadottir, The FinancingofInternationalizedCriminalCourtsand
Tribunals, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTs 271 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Andrd Nollkaemper & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004); Cesare Romano, The Priceof InternationalJustice, 4
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ample, are "borne by voluntary contributions from the international
community., 56 The Presidents of the International Criminal Court and
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) depend on
their respective States Parties to bear their courts' expenses, in ways decided by their Assemblies of States Parties. 7 And the Presidents of the

ICJ, ICTY, and ICTR go hat in hand to the UN General Assembly at
least every other year to garner sufficient funds. 58 Conceivably, States

can signal their displeasure with a court by limiting its funds. Indeed,
one scholar has asserted recently that "[k]eeping [the ICJ] on a tight
budget
looks increasingly like a poorly concealed attempt to influence
9
5

it."1
The final category of external control is decision control: mecha-

nisms that remove a State from a court's jurisdiction, either ex ante or
ex post, or deny the applicability to a State of a court's ruling. Decision
control is different from mandate control because it operates at the level

of the individual State. Jurisdictional avoidance can occur in three ways:
a State may refuse to consent to a court's jurisdiction in whole or in
part; a State may take a reservation to a treaty, thereby denying a court
the ability to apply the specified rule to that State; and a State, having

previously consented to a court's jurisdiction or to a treaty regime, usually may exit. Denial of a court's ruling takes the form of noncompli60
ance.

There are, of course, many examples of decision control. In 1986, in
reaction to rulings by the ICJ, the United States withdrew its blanket

LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 281 (2005).

56. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
States have not always voluntarily provided sufficient funds to the Special Court, and the United
Nations was called upon in 2004 to make up the shortfall. See G.A. Res. 58/284, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/284 (Apr. 8, 2004).
57. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, art. 19; Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 115.
58. The budgets of the ICJ and the ad hoc tribunals are voted on every two years, though
there are occasional amendments. See, e.g., G.A. Res 58/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/255 (Dec. 23,
2003) (ICTY); G.A. Res. 59/274, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/274 (Dec. 23, 2004) (ICTY); G.A. Res
59/273, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/273 (Dec. 23, 2004) (ICTR); G.A. Res 58/253, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/5 8/253 (Dec. 23, 2003) (ICTR); The Secretary-General, ProposedProgrammeBudgetfor
the Biennium 2006-2007, Part III, U.N. Doc. A/60/6 (Sect. 7) (Apr. 22, 2005) (SecretaryGeneral's request on behalf of the ICJ for the 2006-2007 biennium ICJ budget).
59. Romano, supra note 55, at 286.
60. On noncompliance, see Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the InternationalRule of
Law, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 189 (2006).
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consent to the Court's jurisdiction, 61 and in 2005 the United States

withdrew from a treaty that gave the Court jurisdiction over disputes
pertaining to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.62 The
United States now generally refuses to consent to any treaty that provides the ICJ with jurisdiction over disputes without having the option
to waive such a provision.6 3 But the United States, certainly, is far from
the only State that has avoided-partially or entirely-the decisional au-

thority of international courts or failed to comply with a court's ruling.64
For example, in 2002, Australia revised its consent to ICJ and ITLOS
jurisdiction to exclude disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime
zones, lest a possible claim be brought against it in those fora by East
Timor.6 5 And in 2004, the United Kingdom altered its general consent
61. See Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N.
Sec'y-Gen. (Oct. 7, 1985), 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State (Oct. 7,
1985), 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); Legal Adviser Sofaer's Statement (Dec. 4, 1985), DEP'T STATE
BULL. Jan. 1986, at 67.
62. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawnfrom World JudicialBody, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2005, at A16; Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan,
U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf.
63. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 66(3), G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct.
31, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 37; Letter of Submittal of the Department of State on the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 109-6, at 20 (2005).
64. See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 39

(1974); cf Laurence R. Heifer, OverlegalizingHuman Rights: InternationalRelations Theory and
the Commonwealth CaribbeanBacklash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832 (2002).
65. See Declaration [of Australia] Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice Concerning Australia's Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Mar. 21,
2002,
2175
U.N.T.S.
494,
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/5.html (amending its declaration to preclude "any dispute
concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the
exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation"); Declaration [of Australia] Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Concerning the Application to Australia of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of that Convention,
Mar.
21,
2002,
2177
U.N.T.S.
307,
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/6.html (declaring that Australia "does not
accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations"). Australia was concerned that East Timor, upon gaining independence, would submit a dispute to the
ICJ or ITLOS regarding sovereignty over the Timor Gap. See Gillian Triggs & Dean Bialek, Australia Withdraws Maritime Disputesfrom the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt
of Justiceand the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 423, 423 (2002).
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to the jurisdiction of the ICJ so that a threatened case by Mauritius
would not fall within the Court's competence.6 6
B.

Limitations on External Controls

External controls, from the look of them, are imposing, but upon
closer examination they are less so. Aside from decision control (discussed further below), which works unilaterally and thus is not easily
mediated, external controls require cooperation and coordination among
States and therefore are more susceptible to frustration. As a consequence, there are two fundamental limitations on external controls over
international courts: judicial independence and structural constraints inherent in the international system. These limits significantly undermine
the efficacy of external controls over international courts.
As an initial matter, States have less control over judges than they
do over other international civil servants because of judicial independence.6 7 Independence, here, means the freedom from coercion.68 Such
independence means that States cannot direct judges to decide cases in
certain ways, even if those judges are nationals of that State. Though the
presumption of judicial independence may not have obtained for certain
ICJ judges from totalitarian States during the Cold War,69 it must be assumed today. This is not to suggest, certainly, that judges are completely impartial, especially when they decide cases in which their State
of nationality is a party, only that judges are free to decide cases in ac66. See Declaration of the United Kingdom Under Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute,
July 5, 2004, 2271 U.N.T.S. 285 (altering the United Kingdom's previous declaration so that the
Court's jurisdiction would henceforth cover only disputes arising after January 1, 1974 and those
that are brought by States that are not and have never been a member of the Commonwealth). The
United Kingdom was fearful that Mauritius would bring a case regarding the status of the Chagos
Islands in the Indian Ocean. See Nita Bhalla, Mauritius Stakes Claim for Chagos, BBC NEWS,
Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/afiica/3583927.stm; Ewen MacAskill, Mauritius
May Sue for Diego Garcia, THE GUARDIAN,
July
7,
2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1255446,00.html.
67. See Steve Chamovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND

PROSPECTS 219, 228 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano & Ruth Mackenzie
eds., 2002) (noting that "judicial independence was recognized by the parties drafting the WTO").
68. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of JudicialIndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535,
536 (1999).
69. See Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru Oda and the InternationalCourt
of Justice, 33 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 185, 187 (1995). The Soviet Union claimed the same with regard to Western ICJ judges. See Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contributionto InternationalAdjudication: ProfessorKrylov 's JurisprudentialLegacy, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 365 (1964).
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cordance with their views, which will necessarily reflect their backgrounds.7 °
That States take judicial independence seriously became evident during the discussion in the Security Council of the completion strategies
for the ICTY and ICTR. 7 1 Some States worried that directing the ad hoc
courts to complete their missions by certain dates impermissibly directed the courts, particularly their judges, to take certain positions.
France, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, made clear
its view that the completion strategies "should not be construed as undermining the principle of independence of the two Tribunals and the
separation of their functions [from those of the Council]. 72 As a consequence of the need and desire for judicial independence, it has been, according to a UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, "extremely difficult for... the Tribunals' parent organ, the Security Council,
to hold [them] strictly accountable." 7
Aside from judicial independence, there are numerous structural constraints that limit the ability of States to control international courts.
There are three types: (1) multiple and collective principals constraints;
(2) monitoring constraints; and (3) competing nonlegal policy constraints.
Constraints on State control flow, in part, from the fact that international courts have multiple and/or collective principals. Thus, even
when the control mechanism is centralized, such as through the Security
Council or an Assembly of States Parties, control is effectively mitigated by the inability of States to agree. This is especially evident with
developed legal sysrules control. Unlike in the United States and other
75
74
tems, where judicial interpretations of statutory and constitutional
70. Cf Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the InternationalCourt of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005).
71. As a formal matter, statutes of international courts state that judges are to be "independent." See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 2 ("The Court shall
be composed of a body of independent judges....").
72. Letter Dated 30 March 2004 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/265 (2004).
73. Ralph Zacklin, The FailingsofAd Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
541, 543 (2004).
74. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (concluding that "Congress and its committees are
aware of the [Supreme] Court's statutory decisions, devote significant efforts toward analyzing
their policy implications, and override those decisions with a frequency heretofore unreported").
75. Four constitutional amendments have overturned Supreme Court decisions: the Eleventh
Amendment, overturning Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); the Fourteenth Amendment,
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provisions can be and are overturned, States have great difficulty with
re-legislating international law.7 6 This, as one commentator has written,
is international law's "missing legislator" problem. 7 Identical difficulties apply to revising a court's mandate.
For similar reasons, States cannot effectively control courts through
appointments. Inter-State coordination of nominations and elections
takes the form of horse-trading and not substantive review. And typically, judges are nominated and rotated on a geographical basis that has
no connection ex ante with a judge's views or ex post with a judge's decisions. As Judge Thomas Buergenthal has recently written, "What
struck me in my re-election campaign is how highly politicized the election process is for the various judicial positions that the UN membership
has to vote for and how little judicial qualifications of the individual
candidates or their judicial record seem to matter., 78 Even the permanent five members of the Security Council, which traditionally have
guaranteed seats on some international courts, seldom rotate their
judges, even when there has been a change in government. Only in exceptional cases have substantive considerations mattered.79 Judges,
therefore, have little concern that their decisions will affect their
chances for reappointment or promotion, and this increases their independence while on the bench.8 0
overturning Dred Scott v. Sandford,60 U.S. 393 (1857); the Sixteenth Amendment, overturning
Pollock v. Farmers'Loan& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
overturning Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). There is, of course, a large literature on
"conversations" between courts and the legislative and executive branches. See, e.g., Luc B.
Tremblay, The Legitimacy ofJudicialReview: The Limits of DialogueBetween Courtsand Legislatures, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 617 (2005).
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey Atik, Democratizingthe WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451, 454
(2001); Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Procedureor Only a Two-Stage Process?A Comparative View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO DisputeSettlement Understanding,30 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 193, 213 (1999); Vaughan Lowe, Advocating JudicialActivism: The ITLOS
Opinions ofJudgeIvan Shearer,24 AUSTL.Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 151-52 (2005).
77. Armin von Bogdandy, Law andPolitics in the WTO--Strategies to Cope with a Deficient
Relationship,5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 609, 651 (2001).
78. Buergenthal, Proliferationof Disputes,supra note 28, at 498.
79. Thus, the majority of the UN General Assembly, unhappy with the ICJ's judgment in the
South West Africa (Second Phase)case, replaced the judges who voted on the "wrong" side. As a
consequence, five years later the court's decision was essentially reversed in the Namibia case,
reflecting a "change of attitude on the part of the Court." See Ram Prakash Anand, Enhancing the
Acceptability of Compulsory Procedures of InternationalDispute Resolution, 5 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 10 (2001); Edward McWhinney, The InternationalCourt of Justice
and International Law-Making: The Judicial Activism/Self-Restraint Antinomy, 5 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 3, 10-11 (2006).
80. See Karen J. Alter, Resolving or ExacerbatingDisputes? The WTO's New DisputeReso-
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Monitoring constraints also mitigate effective control of international
courts. In domestic systems, we rely upon a host of actors-the govemment, private parties (including practitioners and academics), and the
media-to monitor and report on judicial activities. In the international
system, such monitoring devices exist but are much more attenuated or
non-functional. Thus, even though many (though not all) court sessions
are open, decisions and opinions are public, and press releases are issued, the media report on only the most high-profile cases (such as that
of Slobodan Milogevi6) and seldom with any insight. 8' Further, even the
most affluent of States cannot afford the resources to track every action
of every court. With particularly active courts, such as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, it is especially difficult to read and analyze
the plethora of documents produced. It is true that some States, including the United Kingdom and the United States, maintain very small
staffs in The Hague and Geneva to, among other things, monitor and interact with the tribunals that sit there, but it is still next to impossible to
digest everything. For the vast majority of States, it is impossible. Even
the UN Security Council and General Assembly have difficulties.82 One
might expect States to only truly pay careful attention to courts when
they participate (or have a direct interest) in a proceeding-for example,

lution System, 79 INT'L AFF. 783, 795-96 (2003); Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (1999). But see Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and
Legal Unification-TheAgency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333, 337-38 (2002) (arguing that the
limited tenure of international judges makes them less likely to be inventive in ways that upset the
States that nominate them). Contrast the domestic situation in the United States and Japan: Mark
A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing
Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 192-95 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen,
JudicialIndependence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidencefrom Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
259 (1997); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Chartingthe Influences on the
JudicialMind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1487-93
(1998).
81. See Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participantsin the InternationalLegal Process, 16
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 21-27 (2006).
82. See Dominic Raab & Hans Bevers, The InternationalCriminalCourt and the Separation
of Powers, 3 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2006) ("Representatives on the Fifth Committee [of
the General Assembly, which is responsible for budgetary issues,] and the Security Council often
lack a high level of specific expertise in or experience with criminal courts.").
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as a party or when subject to orders
by a court. 8 3 Much happens, there84
oversight.
of
fore, in the absence
But even if a few State officials can get a handle on what is going on,
it is difficult for a State to react to judicial overreaching. This is not just
a matter of bureaucracy; it is also a matter of competing policies. Legal
policy is only one of any number of policies that make up a State's foreign policy. 85 Thus, even if a State decides that an international tribunal
has exceeded its jurisdiction or committed an error of law that would
have a direct effect on that State's international obligations, it is still
possible that the State would take no corrective action because of other,
competing policies. For instance, even if the United States took issue
with a particular ruling of the ICTY, one might wonder whether it
would attempt to take action against the ICTY because the United States
is strongly supportive of that institution for foreign policy reasons. The
same is true of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, though for different reasons. Thus, while the United States has disagreed fundamentally with a number of decisions of the Iran Tribunal, 86 it has not withdrawn its consent to the Tribunal's jurisdiction (as it could) because
doing so would potentially have repercussions in the sensitive bilateral
relations between the two countries.
C.

The Limits ofExternal Controls:Inefficiency

In domestic systems, we have a structure of independent judges
within a dependent judiciary. 87 Individual judges are provided independence but the courts are kept in check by various intermediate control mechanisms-primarily re-legislating and re-allocation of jurisdiction. Though only occasionally used, such controls are effective because
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel
Application for Interview and Testimony of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schr6der (Dec. 9, 2005);
Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalDecision: Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Decisions on Requests of
the UnitedStates of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisationfor Review, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 163 (2007).
84. See, e.g., Raab & Bevers, supra note 82, at 104 (noting how the ICTY's "plea-bargaining
and sentencing policy more broadly have developed in a rather haphazard manner without independent review").
85. Cf David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of InternationalCourts and Tribunals,
24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 409 (2006) (noting that there are often political motives for establishing international courts).
86. See, e.g., Iran v. United States, Award No. 529-A15 (II:A and II:B)-FT, Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. (May 6, 1992).
87. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:ExplainingJudicialIndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999).
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they can be wielded efficiently; hence, they act not only as correctives
but as deterrents. When combined with internal controls, they can make
for highly-developed systems of control.
The same cannot be said for international law, which is mostly a system of independent judges within independent courts. Because of the
limitations on external control mechanisms peculiar to the international
system, the optimal conditions for their effectiveness do not exist in
practice, except in limited cases. Courts are most likely to be properly
controlled when they are supervised by fewer principals, when there are
opportunities for effective re-legislating, when they are newer, or when
the stakes are extraordinarily high. Thus, both the NAFTA and the
WTO contain mechanisms for judicial correction, but only in the case of
the NAFTA (and not the 150-member WTO) have the three Parties
agreed to correct a judicial decision. In most cases, international courts
lack effective supervision because the effects of external mechanisms of
control-the ones that are used so well in domestic systems-are mediated by the structural limitations of the international system and by the
principle of judicial independence. As a consequence of the inefficiencies of external control mechanisms, international courts, as88 one commentator has said of the ICTY, largely look after themselves.
III.

CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS EXERT SELF-CONTROL?

Commentators focus on external controls on international courts, as if
those were the only mechanisms that keep judges in check. 89 But as important, if not more important, are internal controls-those checks on
the operation of the judiciary that are applied by judges to themselves. 90
In the absence of effective external checks, internal checks are particularly important because international judges are not simple agents
applying the law disinterestedly, at least not always. International
judges, like their domestic counterparts, have interests like anyone
else. 9 1 These interests are both attitudinal-in the sense of being based
88. See Raab & Bevers, supra note 82, at 104 (quoting Chris Stephen, Analysis: Setting the
Hague Record Straight,

IWPR

TRIBUNAL

UPDATE,

no.

300,

Feb.

10-15,

2003,

http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o= 166536&apcstate= henitri2003).
89. See, e.g., Danner, supranote 17; Ginsburg, supranote 17; Steinberg, supra note 17.
90. Cf Ronald A. Cass, Judging:Norms andIncentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,75

B.U. L. REv. 941, 969 (1995) ("The hard features of our judicial system...largely are useful in a
negative sense... .They do not provide positive inducements to behave in a desirable manner....").
91. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
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on ideology or preferred public policy-and personal-in the sense of
being based on ambition, respect, popularity, and other forms selfinterest. Such interests can run against-and override-the external lim-

its placed upon international courts and judges. Hence the need arises
not only for effective external controls, but also for effective internal
controls.
This Part looks at techniques of judicial self-control and their limits.
It argues that while there are a number of internal control mechanisms
that operate on international judges, these are, by their very nature,
weak. On the other hand, international judges have strong interests of
their own, and those interests are empowered by the inherent authorities

of international courts.
A.

Internal Controls on InternationalCourts

Internal controls on international courts are both formal and informal.
They can be divided into three categories of constraints: professional
norms, judicial ego, and legal process. 92 All three types of control are

weak, but they do have their effects and they cannot be ignored.
Foremost, international judges are limited by the professional norms

associated with their office, primarily independence and impartiality.93
Though such norms exist as a necessary consequence of a judge's elec-

tion, "for [a new] international judge to conduct himself in an impartial
and independent way," writes Judge Theodor Meron, "may require adaptation and discipline." 94 As part of this process, the statutes of most
international courts require that judges, before they take their seats,
make a solemn declaration 95 that is designed to impart notions of impar518 (1986); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges andJustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation,
and the Inglorious Determinants ofJudicialBehavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000). My discussion of judicial self-interest relies a good deal on work done in the U.S. context by, among others,
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

(2006); Cass, supra note 90; and Schauer, supra.
92. Though some of the restrictions noted in this Section are (or might be considered) also
"external" controls, I refer to them here insofar as they are applied by judges to themselves.
93. These norms are seldom specified in any detail. The Code of Judicial Ethics, adopted by
the judges of the International Criminal Court, is an exception. See Code of Judicial Ethics, ICChttp://www.icc2003),
available
at
BD/02-01-05
(Mar.
9,
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ICC-BD02-01-05_En.pdf.
94. Meron, supranote 12, at 360.
95. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 20 ("Every
member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court
that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously."); Rome Statute of the Interna-
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tiality and conscientiousness to the persons taking the oath-in other
words to appeal to their "internal compass." 96 To bolster their effect,
oaths are administered publicly. This is intended to suggest to the judge
that he or she is publicly accountable in the event of a failure to abide
by judicial norms of conduct. It is also intended to satisfy the audience
that the judge will act in accordance with the norms expected of him or
her. Professional norms thus act upon judges in two ways: as a reminder
of agreed judicial standards and as a reminder of the possible consequences resulting from the failure to abide by those standards.
Judges also enjoy adulation and care about the prestige of their office, and this too might limit their actions. Judges might be concerned
about their popularity with particular groups-such as members of the
international bar, international law academics, and nongovernmental organizations-for reasons of ego (wanting to be respected), influence,
and even monetary rewards (for example, by being appointed an arbitrator in international arbitrations). 97 They might care about their reputation among their colleagues, both on their own court and on other international courts, also for reasons of ego and influence.98 In these and
other ways, international judges have been said to be a part of a "global
community of law" that restricts their decision-making. 99 Finally, international judges care about whether their decisions will be complied with
by States (both the parties to the case and non-parties) and whether
States may withdraw their consent from 0 0the Court's jurisdiction, and
this may affect their decision-making too.'
tional Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 45; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, supra note 37, art. 11; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 14, IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev39e.pdf; Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 14 (June 7, 2005), available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISHIrules/070605/070605.pdf.
96. Cass, supranote 90, at 978.
97. See Posner, supra note 91, at 13-15. Stephen Schwebel, former judge and president of the
International Court of Justice, was a member of more than two dozen arbitral panels during his
career on the court. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT ET AL., LEGAL OPINION ON GUATEMALA'S TER-

RITORIAL CLAIM TO BELIZE 1 (2001), http://www.mfa.gov.bz/library/documents/ LegalOpinionon.pdf.
98. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1014, 1046 (2007).
99. Heifer & Slaughter, supranote 17, at 953; see also Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College
of InternationalLawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 217 (1977); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).
100. Thus, in some circumstances, it appears that judges and arbitrators have issued decisions
that were designed to avoid noncompliance by one of the parties to the dispute. See, e.g., United
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Judges are restricted, as well, in a number of technical and procedural
ways. As a formal matter, they are restricted by the jurisdictional and
other limits imposed by States in a court's mandate. They are also limited by the texts of the agreements they apply, as well as by precedent
and other sources of law, including interpretative rules. 10 1 The requirement that a court give reasoned, public opinions10 2 that are in accor-

dance with law can also set limits to a judge's decision-making.10 3 And
some courts, such as the international criminal tribunals and the WTO,
reinclude multi-judge panels and forms of appellate or quasi-appellate
04
view in order to decrease the possibility of partiality and error.'
B.

Limitationson Internal Controls

There are, thus, a number of ways in which judges can constrain or
are constrained by themselves. But there are a number of factors, some

unique and some not unique to the international system, that work in favor of judicial discretion. Indeed, some of the internal constraints on
judging can in fact cut in favor of activism, and other internal constraints, such as giving reasoned opinions, are not necessarily effective. 0 5 There are two general types of limits on internal controls: the
personal and institutional interests of judges and the institutional author-

ity of courts.

States v. Iran, Decision No. DEC 132-A33-FT, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. (Sept. 9, 2004); United States
v. Iran, Decision No. DEC 130-A28-FT, Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. (Dec. 19, 2000). In domestic systems,
lower court judges who desire promotion have the related anxiety of possible reversal by a higher
court. See Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence From Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992).
101. This can be true, even though, as a formal matter, international judges are not bound by
prior decisions. See, e.g., MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT
(1996).
102. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 56(1) ("The
judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based."); Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, supranote 37, art. 30(1) (same).
103. See Frederick Schauer, GivingReasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (1995).
104. See, e.g., Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centrepiece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 289, 292-94 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan

Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006).
105. Reasons can easily cover a self-interested decision. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent
Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosisand Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND
CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998). On the failure of the International
Court of Justice to give reasons in one case, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli
Wall Advisory Opinion:An Ipse Dixitfrom the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005).
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Like all judges, international judges have a variety of personal and
institutional interests that overlap with or derive from their professional
roles. They have views about public policy; they have opinions regarding the role of courts and judges; and they have concerns about their
reputations and popularity. 10 6 These interests cohere into a tendency, as
Karen Alter has written, for judges to "promot[e] [judicial] independence, influence, and authority."' 1 7 Thus, judges seek independence and
autonomy from political bodies, and they seek to increase the relevance
of their decisions. 0 8 They also tend to advocate expanding the power of
the law, as by doing so they also expand their own power.' 0 9
Given the structure of the international system, with its gaps, ambiguities, deficient legislative process, and weak enforcement mechanisms, these inclinations-and the opportunities to act on them-are
even greater for international judges. As a result, international judges
often believe in the "development of international law"'10 or, as Judge
Jennings put it, "the scientific development of general international
law."'' Knowing how difficult it is for States to fill the gaps, they see it
as their responsibility to do so by putting their "imprimatur" on such
development."l 2 Judge Jennings wrote approvingly, "It is probable that
in view of the difficulties surrounding the codification of international
law, international tribunals will in the future fulfill, inconspicuously but
' 13
efficiently, a large part of the task of developing international law.""
Judge Koroma, referring to this prediction, commented, "I believe that's
what we try to do."' "1 4 Judge Simma of the International Court of Jus106. See generally BAUM, supranote 91.
107. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 45 (2001).

108. See id. at 45-46.
109. See John 0. McGinnis, The Limits of InternationalLaw in ProtectingDignity, 27 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 141 (2003) (arguing that international court judges expand their own authority by expanding the authority of international law); Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic andLimits
of Partners' Liability in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 63 (1997) (noting that bankruptcy judges decide cases in ways that expand their authority).
110. NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 137 (1989).
111. Robert Jennings, The Role of the InternationalCourt ofJustice in the Development of InternationalEnvironment ProtectionLaw, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY. & INT'L EmVT'L L. 240, 242

(1992), quoted in Reisman, supranote 32, at 52.
112. Jennings, supra note 11l, at 241.
113.

1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.

1992).
114. Abdul G. Koroma, International Courts and Tribunals: Alternatives to Treaty Making,
in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 621, 625 (Riudiger Wolfrum &
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tice, writing in two recent judgments, complained about the "inappropriate self-restraint" and the "unnecessarily cautious way[s]" of his colleagues 1 5 and Judge ad hoc Shearer argued in an opinion that it was for
the ITLOS to strike "[a] new 'balance"' in the law since "circumstances
have now changed."' "16 International judges are also believers in the
power of international law and adjudication. The courts through their
decisions can, some judges claim, "secur[e] the promotion of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations between States." ' 1 7 Thus, like constitutional court judges, international
court judges "seek both to preserve the normative superiority of [international law] and to ensure that [international law] becomes, or continues to be, the essential reference
point for the settlement of like cases
' 18
that may arise in the future."
Courts and judges not only have their own interests; they also have
their own authorities. They initially have (some) authority because it
was given to them by States. But they have other kinds of authoritiesindependent of what State's bestow upon them-by virtue of their expertise and the legitimacy inherent in their judicial role." 9 International
courts, therefore, have "the ability...to use institutional and discursive
resources to induce deference from others."' 20 That ability is based in
their missions, their goals, and their methods, the ways in which they go
about achieving those goals. With such abilities, international courts can
use their authority to regulate current and future behavior by States and
other actors. In so doing, they potentially can go beyond what States
have delegated to them, as, once established, international courts have
Volker Rbben eds., 2005).
115. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 327 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge
Simma); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Lexis 7
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
116. The "Volga" Case (No. 11) (Russ. v. Austl.), 42 I.L.M. 159, 196 (Int'l Trib. L. of the
Sea
2002)
(dissenting
opinion
of Judge
ad hoc
Shearer),
available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
117. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 121 (Nov. 12)
(joint dissenting opinion of Judges Aguilar Mawdsley and Ranjeva), quoted in Reisman, supra
note 32, at 53.
118. ALEC STONE SWEET,

GOVERNING

WITH JUDGES:

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

IN

EUROPE 141 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers ofInternationalCourtsand Tribunals, 76
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 195 (2005); Mich~le Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, When the Statute and
Rules Are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 65 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
120. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 5 (2004).
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authorities independent of that delegation. These powers can be substantial,12' as the European Court of Justice's construction of its own22authority and its transformation of the EU legal system demonstrates.
C.

The Limits ofInternal Controls:MoralHazard

Judicial independence acts like insurance, decreasing the risk to
judges (the insured) of repercussions for their decisions on the bench.
The advantages of insurance (and independence), though, can also have
attendant costs, namely moral hazard, in which the insured's behavior
changes to such an extent that the associated risks and losses increase
123
substantially because their costs no longer accrue to the insured.
Thus, judicial independence (and the ineffectiveness of external controls
generally) allows judges the freedom to pursue their own interests, subject only to internal controls.
And even more so than their domestic colleagues, international
judges have interests that make them inherent judicial expansionists, as
well as authorities that provide them the opportunities to implement
those predilections. Believers in the power of law, international judges
see it as their duty to use the courts to develop international law and to
consolidate the international rule of law. Internal controls have their effects-judges feel compelled to decide cases under the law, as a matter
of substance and process. But internal controls, which are naturally
weak as they depend on self-control, can only counter these tendencies
so much. Law, particularly international law, is malleable, and judges
have great discretion. While international judges, of course, are not entirely free agents, they are hardly opinionless automatons either.

121. Especially when combined with the ability of courts to act incrementally over a long period of time. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Stability andChange in JudicialDecision-Making:Incrementalism or StareDecisis?, 2 LAW TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965).
122. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Mastersof the Treaty"?: EuropeanGovernments
and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121 (1998); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L.
Brunell, Constructing a SupranationalConstitution:Dispute Resolution and Governance in the
European Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 74 (1998); Alec Stone Sweet & James A.
Caporaso, From Free Trade to SupranationalPolity: The European Court and Integration, in
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 92 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec

Stone Sweet eds., 1998); cf Shoaib A. Ghias, InternationalJudicialLawmaking: A Theoretical
andPoliticalAnalysis of the WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 534 (2006).
123. Cf REISMAN, supranote 7, at 8. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard,75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
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IV. COMPETITION AND CONTROL
States are not unaware of the importance and fragility ofjudicial control mechanisms. For example, during the Security Council debates on
the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, some States put down
markers for the new courts. Thus, the representative of Venezuela stated
that the ICTY, "as a subsidiary organ of the Council, would not be empowered with-nor would the Council be assuming-the ability to set
down norms of international law or to legislate with respect to those
rights. It simply applies existing international humanitarian law.', 124 And
the representative of Argentina indicated that the ICTR "is not authorized to establish rules of international law or to legislate as regards such
law but, rather, it is to apply existing international law."1' 25 This was
also a concern of the drafters of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, who embedded in that agreement the rule that
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the D[ispute] S[ettlement] B[ody]
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."' 126 And as we have seen, the drafters of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court went to great lengths to reduce judicial discretion by drafting detailed Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and Elements of Crimes and all but eliminating judicial rulemaking. As States have created more courts, and noticed the flaws of
existing courts, they have become increasingly interested in controlling
courts ab initio.
But, as the above analysis indicates, these attempts will ultimately be
ineffectual. Like international organizations generally, 27 international
courts have minds and interests of their own. As a result, they can be
tempted to expand their powers beyond those provided for in their constitutive documents or by informal expectations. At the same time, international courts are protected from external control because of the
124. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (statement of Mr. Arria, representative of Venezuela). It is true that the ad hoc tribunals can create their
own rules and that those rules influence the outcome of cases, but that does not mean that the Security Council delegated lawmaking authority to those courts.
125. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (statement of Ms. Cafias, representative of Argentina).
126. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 2 (Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes), art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1226, 1227.
127. See, e.g., BARNETT & FtNNEMORE, supra note 120 (discussing the autonomy and authority of secretariats of international organizations).
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principle of judicial independence and because of structural constraints
on international lawmaking and institutional reform. This combination
of weak external control and imperfect self-control provides international courts with opportunities to exceed their mandates. Though the
likelihood of this occurring varies by court (and even by case), there
should be no doubt that international judges not only have the opportunity and the tools,
well. 129

128

but, on occasion, the willingness to do this as

Traditional mechanisms of control are imperfect because they fail to
effectively act upon the needs of courts and judges to maintain their influence and authority. If judges have little reason to worry about external controls-that their decisions will affect their chances for reelection;
that their rulings will be overturned legislatively; that their mandates
will not operate perpetually; that their rulings will not diminish the
number of cases on their docket-then they have little incentive to
check their own actions. This is why those who are troubled by the
breakdown of control have often looked to internal controls, suggesting
that international judges be better attuned to their unique roles and exert
greater self-control. 130 Yet, as these same commentators acknowledge,
self-control is a weak hook upon which to hang international dispute
resolution. What is needed are controls that are tailored to and take advantage of the structure of the international system as it exists today and
the various intersecting incentives and capacities created by that structure.
Because of the strong judicial desire to have a positive role in the international legal order, the most effective controls on judges, therefore,
will play on that need. And the best way to do that is by restricting, or
threatening to restrict, the main vehicle for judicial influence: cases. In
other words, international judges are most likely to exert self-control if
128. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, ConstitutionalismLite, I INT'L ORG. L. REV. 31, 37-41 (2004)
(describing the doctrines of conferred powers, functional necessity, and ultra vires that judges use
to expand their powers).
129. See, e.g., REISMAN, supranote 7, at 11 -45 (describing the breakdown of informal jurisdictional limits at the ICJ); Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US-Zeroing:A Study in JudicialOverreachingby the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 196 (2006) (concluding
that, in a recent case, "the Appellate Body inappropriately expanded the WTO's authority to hear
facial challenges").
130. See REISMAN, supra note 7, at 143; Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the
WTO: How to Avoid JudicialActivism, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 861 (2004); J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization:DevelopingPrinciplesofSelf-Restraint, 22 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 353 (2002).
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they can envision harms to their core self-interests by failing to do so. A
system of competitive adjudication provides such a mechanism.
A.

CompetitiveAdjudication

Which brings us back to consent and decision control. The easiest
and most effective way for States to control courts is to limit their ability to decide cases, by actions taken either ex ante or ex post. This is
usually viewed negatively, as States opting out of the international legal
system. But there is potentially a positive side to decision control, too,
for a State's refusal to consent to a court's jurisdiction or a State's withdrawal from that jurisdiction communicates to the court that that State is
unsatisfied with the quality of the court's work. 131 States have an interest, among other things, 32 in finding courts that provide them with "unbiased, accurate, reasonable, and prompt resolution of disputes,"'' 33 and
failing that, they can and sometimes do withdraw. If enough States (or
important enough States) did this, then a court might lose its customer
base, and without customers, a court could slide into irrelevance and
maybe even shut down. Though international judges are not as dependent on litigants as pre-nineteenth-century English judges, whose salaries
were based on the fees they received, they will still be solicitous of the
needs of States, except in certain circumstances (noted below), in order
to maintain their standing, prestige, and influence in the international
legal order. 134 Faced with losing market share (and its potential consequences) because States withdraw from or refuse to accede to their jurisdiction, courts-like any supplier of goods and services-will look to
135
reinvent themselves as more customer-friendly.
This process of evaluation and re-evaluation is enhanced when a
State has multiple fora to choose from when submitting a dispute to ad131. I leave aside here the issue of noncompliance.
132. Of course, litigants usually seek out a forum that will be biased in their favor; hence, forum shopping. But where litigants do not have free choice of fora, that is, when the forum depends on a mutual choice of plaintiff and defendant, as in the international arena, the interests of
the parties shift to these more neutral criteria. For a general discussion of factors States might
consider, see Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both? DisputeSettlement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 246-65 (2004).
133. Zywicki, supranote 1,at 1585.
134. See id at 1587-88; Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Privateand Public Judges, 41
PUB.CHOICE 107, 129 (1983).
135. Cf Cooter, supra note 134, at 107 ("[S]ome private judges have to attract business, so
they are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who sells a service.").

2008]

COMPETITION AND CONTROL

judication. The ability of States to choose among courts or to forego
them entirely and the desire of courts to adjudicate cases and adjust their
procedures to attract litigants together generate the incentives and dynamics for competitive adjudication. Courts will endeavor to make
rules-both procedural and substantive-that accord with the interests
of States, and courts will monitor the decisions of their competitors (and
how they are received) in order to decide whether to adopt those innovations themselves. In this way, competition among courts can create ef36
fective control. 1
The market for international legal services can serve as an effective
control mechanism not only because it creates incentives for courts to
mediate their actions in order to attract litigants, but also because the
system, as constructed, does not establish a bias in favor of a particular
set of litigants, plaintiffs or defendants.1 37 The dangers of forum shopping are, therefore, diminished considerably. Not all competitive systems are so evenhanded. In the United States, for example, state longarm statutes and choice-of-law rules allow plaintiffs in class-action tort
litigation to unilaterally choose their forum, and elected state judiciaries
have incentives to favor these plaintiffs, thereby creating a pro-plaintiff
bias in certain jurisdictions. 38 In the international system, plaintiffs do
not have this choice, as the consent of both parties is required as a basis
for jurisdiction, and plaintiffs must choose their forum with the foreknowledge that they may be subject to the same rules as a potential future defendant. Thus, as with arbitrators in international commercial arbitration, international judges "have strong incentives 13to9 make decisions
that make both parties to the case, ex ante, better off.'
In some ways, international dispute resolution has always been a
competitive system. States had their choice of fora, whether it was the
136. Ruth Wedgwood has suggested a system of "competitive multilateralism" that would
lead to reform of international organizations, such as the United Nations. See Ruth Wedgwood,
Editorial, Give the UnitedNationsa Little Competition,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at A23.
137. This is in contrast to the pre-nineteenth-century English legal system. See, e.g., Daniel
Klerman, JurisdictionalCompetition and the Evolution of the Common Law (Univ. of S.Cal.
CLEO, Research Paper No. C07-4, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-968701.
138. See Todd J.Zywicki, Is Forum-ShoppingCorruptingAmerica's Bankruptcy Courts?, 94
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1154-57 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How
COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)).

139. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
CommercialArbitration,33 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 107 (2000) (emphasis added); see also
Cooter, supra note 134, at 131 ("Private judges who maximize demand for their services from
disputants, each of whom has the power to veto choice of a judge, will make decisions which are
pairwise Pareto efficient....").
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ICJ (or its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice) or
ad hoc arbitral tribunals. Sometimes, because of the nature of the dispute, only one forum-permanent or ad hoc-was available. But mostly

States had their pick and opted for the forum that best suited their
needs. 40 Thus, for example, States have variously resorted to the
ICJ
14
and ad hoc arbitration to resolve their maritime boundary disputes. 1

That said, the proliferation of courts, principally over the past fifteen
years, has expanded the possibilities for competition significantly. Ad
hoc tribunals are fine, but, in the end, competition is enhanced by more
permanent institutions because permanent judges-given the length of
their tenure and the permanency of their courts-have greater incentives

to maintain their status positions and influences than do arbitrators and
because more permanent courts create a greater range of choices for
litigants.
Competition has also increased because of a proliferation of treaties
that institutionalize a framework of competitive adjudication.

42

The

best example of such entrenched competition is the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 287 of UNCLOS
provides for compulsory dispute settlement of certain disputes but allows parties to the Convention to choose between four different types 143
of
dispute resolution: the ITLOS, the ICJ, and two types of arbitration.

The default (in cases where a State has not chosen a preferred forum ex
140. On why States may prefer arbitration over adjudication, see Loretta Malintoppi, Methods
of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go to ArbitrationRather Than Adjudication, 5 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 133 (2006).
141. See Charney, supra note 28, at 315.
142. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 30, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S.
3, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1569-70; Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 19,
Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1468; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities arts. 56-57, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (not in force); United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. A number
of trade agreements give the parties the choice of fora, including the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body, when a dispute arises under both the agreement and the WTO agreements. See, e.g., Olivos
Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur art. 1(2), Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2;
NAFTA, supra note 48, art. 2005. See Pauwelyn, supra note 132, at 270-77. Nonbinding dispute
settlement provisions that include choice of fora include the Convention on Biological Diversity
art. 27, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 31 I.L.M. 818; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 14, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 11, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1533-34; and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art. 25, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T.
3476, 19 I.L.M. 841.
143. See UNCLOS, supranote 142, art. 287.
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ante or where States have not consented to the same forum) is to one of
the two forms of arbitration. 144 Because States can alter their dispute
resolution choice at any time prior to a dispute or can agree ad hoc to
one of the four dispute resolution mechanisms, the Convention imbeds
competition. 145 This system of choice was established because the States
negotiating the Convention could not agree upon a single method of adjudication, 146 and the resulting approach makes it more likely that States
that are considering ratifying the Convention will not be put off by the
Convention's compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. 147 As a result
of this competition, States may forum shop and tribunals may 48
seek to
make themselves more amenable to perceived State preferences.'
Competition among tribunals is not purely theoretical. Alain Pellet,
who has appeared many times as counsel before the ICJ and other international tribunals, noted recently that "[p]arties have the impression that
the political, financial and human efforts involved in their consent to
bring a case to the World Court are not compensated and they therefore
turn toward other fora, which are perhaps less prestigious, but just as effective."' 149 And the impact of this competitive framework is already
evident in the acts of courts and in the public statements of judges.
Older institutions have updated their rules to make them more userfriendly. 150 And the practices or powers of one court-such as the au144. See id art. 287(5).
145. See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
andthe InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 809, 817 (1999).
146. See 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
41-45 (Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989); NATALIE KLEIN,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 54 (2005); Shabtai

Rosenne, UNCLOS III-The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGEN 169 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo

Siblesz eds., 1986).
147. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding InternationalDispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (1996).
148. See, e.g., Donald L. Morgan, Implications of the Proliferation of InternationalLegal
Fora: The Example of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 541, 550-51 (2002)
(explaining why ITLOS's procedural practices, such as expediency, and interpretations of substantive law, such as the precautionary principle, might make it an attractive forum for certain
States).
149. Alain Pellet, Remarks on ProceedingsBefore the InternationalCourt of Justice,5 LAW
& PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 163, 181-82 (2006).
150. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0; International Court of Justice, Practice Directions, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=4&p3=0; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/2STATENG.pdf; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbi-
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thority to issue binding provisional measures and the use of law
clerks-are being reviewed, 15 1 adopted, 52 and sought 153 by other courts
in the hope that incorporating those techniques will make them more attractive to potential litigants (or at least as attractive as their competitors). As Rosalyn Higgins, current President of the International Court
of Justice, has written, the "important task for the Court is.. .to ensure
that it can respond as efficaciously as possible to its clientele."1 54 In
these ways, international tribunals are beginning to act like much like
the providers of private international dispute resolution. 155
B.

Limitations on CompetitiveAdjudication

Competitive adjudication works, though, only if judges feel the need
to compete. Consequently, when courts are guaranteed sufficient business (that is, when courts have exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction
and when States have no option but to accede to that jurisdiction), they
will not yield to the pressures of competition. This is the problem of judicial monopoly. For example, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has compulsory jurisdiction over the member states of the
Council of Europe (COE) for violations of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The only mechanism of exit from the Court's jurisdiction is withdrawal from the COE, which is not a desirable option for
56
most States. Consequently, the ECHR has no effective competition.1
tration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment, http://www.pcacpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=590.
151. See, e.g., Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Seafor 2006,
31, SPLOS/152 (Mar. 23, 2007) ("[T]he Tribunal followed closely the developments of the rules
of procedure of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals.").
152. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27) (holding that
provisional measures issued by the court are binding); Romano, supranote 55, at 288.
153. See, e.g., Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int'l Court of Justice, Speech to the General
Assembly
of
the
United
Nations
(Oct.
26,
2006),
http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?pr-1874&pt=3&pl =l&p2=3&p3=l ("Quite simply, the International
Court of Justice can no longer provide the service that Member States bringing cases desire if it,
as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, is denied what is routinely accorded to every
other senior court.").
154. Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States andRunning a Tight Courtroom,50 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 121, 123 (2001).
155. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 139, at 99-102; John Selby, Competitive Justice?: The
Role of Dispute Resolution Providers Under ICANN's UDRP, 1 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 23
(2004).
156. At most, it engages in a dialogue with other international human rights courts. See Antonio Augusto Caneado Trindade, The Merits of Coordinationof InternationalCourts on Human
Rights, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 309 (2004).
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So, too, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which-in the wake of
two recent efforts by Member States to adjudicate claims by ad hoc ar
bitration-declared last year that it had, by virtue of Article 292 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 157 "exclusive jurisdic
tion ... in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States
concerning the interpretation and application of Community law." 158 EU
Member States are therefore prohibited from bringing disputes to courts
and tribunals other than the ECJ when a question of European law is at
issue (and the Court has given a wide interpretation of what constitutes
European law). In monopolistic systems, such as these and others, 159
competitive adjudication will not succeed, and so the only way to effec
tively control such courts is through the re-writing of the rules (or the
threat of re-writing the rules) or noncompliance (or the threat of non
compliance).160
Similarly, competition will also fail if a court is captured by a group
of States who, amongst themselves, provide the court with the necessary
business to maintain its docket. This is the problem of monopsony.1 61
157. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 292, Nov. 10, 1997, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
I (as amended on Feb. 26, 2001).
158. Case C-459/03, Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635, ,i 132. See generally Nikolaos
Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The MOX Plant-Judgment of the ECJ, 5 LAW &
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 479 (2006). This approach accords with the ECJ's refusal to give
direct effect to WTO Appellate Body decisions. See Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999
E.C.R. 1-8395, ,i 47; Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. Belgisch lnterventie- en Restitutiebureau, 2005
E.C.R. 1-1465, ,i 48. See generally Nikolaos Lavranos, The Communitarization of WTO Dispute
Settlement Reports: An Exception to the Rule of Law, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 313 (2005).
159. Other courts with exclusive jurisdiction include the Caribbean Court of Justice and the
Court of Justice of the Andean Community. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice art. XII(!), Feb. 14, 2001, available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/ courtad
ministration/ccj_agreement.pdf; Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community
(as
amended
by
the
Cochabamba
Protocol)
art.
42,
May
28,
1996,
http://www.comunidadandina.org/lNGLES/normativa/ande_trie2.htm. Two WTO dispute settle
ment reports-one by a panel and one by the Appellate Body-have interpreted Article 23(1) of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as providing for exclusive jurisdiction under the
DSU of disputes regarding WTO rights and obligations. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, ,i 111,
WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade
Act of 1974, ,1,17.35, 7.43, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
1 60. On the possibility of re-writing EU law to "correct" ECJ decisions, see MARK A.
POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA
SETTING IN THE EU 200-02 (2003); Tallberg, supra note 13, at 31; and George Tsebelis &
Geoffrey Garrett, The Institutional Foundations of lntergovernmentalism and Supranationalism
in the European Union, 55 INT'L ORG. 357 (2001).
1 61 . A related phenomenon is oligopsony, in which the number of buyers (here States or
groups of States consenting to the jurisdiction of international courts) is too few to sustain a com-
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Indeed, it has been suggested that, at least since the 1980s, the International Court of Justice has been captured by a group of States.' 62 Finally, competition will fail if there is collusion among the suppliers of
international adjudication-international courts-which would establish, in effect, a monopolistic system.
C.

The Limits of Competitive Adjudication: Market Failure

Competitive adjudication will work, therefore, only when competitive conditions obtain. In cases of monopoly, monopsony, or collusion,
control will be difficult to achieve through competition, and market
failure will result. Judicial monopolies may be appropriate in domestic
systems and in highly integrated regional systems, such as Europe,
where controls may be more effectively wielded. 163 But forms of judicial monopolies will impair the possibilities for international judicial
dispute resolution because they hamper the control that comes with
competition among courts.
How then should market failure be combated? How should competition among international courts be facilitated? In domestic systems, monopolistic tendencies in business are controlled either through antitrust
laws or, in the case of natural monopolies (such as public utilities), price
regulation. For international adjudication, the equivalent of price regulations are external controls, such as detailed rule-making-the inherent
difficulties of which we have already noted. But there are other techniques-akin to antitrust law-to entrench competition among courts,
and these are discussed below.
V.

CONCLUSION: COHERENCE AND COMPETITION

The international system needs more not fewer mechanisms for dispute resolution. Consequently, when judicial controls have broken down
or are ineffective, there is the need to repair them. Like all types of reform, control regeneration is difficult but not inconceivable. In the conpetitive market.
162. See REISMAN, supra note 7, at 44.
163. Though, of course, even in some domestic systems judicial competition does exist, for
example, among U.S. bankruptcy jurisdictions and (possibly) among the state courts for corporate
litigation. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 138 (evaluating the benefits of competition among bankruptcy courts). But see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 708-15 (2002) (providing a skeptical account of judicial
competition for corporate cases).
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text of international courts, control reform must take into account judicial independence and, to be effective, must also be sensitive to the
structural constraints inherent in the international system. Competition
accomplishes this by ensuring that the needs of courts and their judges
are linked with the needs of States. Competition is not only an innocuous means of control; it is also a valuable technique for the creation of
better rules and more efficient courts.
Many have worried, though, that competition (and conflicts) among
courts will lead to incoherence and unpredictability in the law and that
will undermine the authority of the international legal system, which, so
it is feared, is already short on credibility. 164 Jurisdictional overlap, in
the words of one commentator, "causes a host of problems such as legal
uncertainty for the parties, endless proceedings through forum-shopping
and re-litigation of the same dispute before different courts and tribunals, creation of 'self-contained' regimes, fragmentation of international
law, and, ultimately, deterioration of the authority of dispute settlement
mechanisms."' 65 If we care about international courts and international
law, the argument goes, we should do what we can to reduce, if not
eliminate, conflict among courts.
Those who worry about incoherence propose two types of mechanisms to resolve such conflicts. The first imagines a hierarchical judicial
system, such as by making the ICJ a court of appeal, giving the ICJ the
authority to render preliminary rulings (modeled on the ECJ), extending
the ICJ's advisory jurisdiction, or creating a Tribunal des Conflits
(modeled on the French system for resolving disputes between the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de Cassation). 166 This is highly unlikely to occur. The second is based on judicial comity, res judicata, lis pendens,
and other "system-protective doctrines" to be created and implemented
by judges. 167 Because "there is no central judicial authority [in interna164. See, e.g., SHANY, supra note 29, at 94, 125-26; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of
Fragmentationor Unification of the InternationalLegal System and the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791 (1999); Emst-Ulich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict
Resolution: Proliferation,Fragmentation,andDecentralizationof Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 366 (2006).
165. Nikolaos Lavranos, The MOX Plant and UIzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 223, 242 (2006).
166. Id. at 243-45; see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:PrivatizingPublicInternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521, 1617-25 (2005) (recommending the creation of an Investment Arbitration Appellate
Court).
167. See SHANY, supra note 29, at 278; Lavranos, supranote 165, at 245-46; Martinez, supra
note 29, at 448; August Reinisch, The Use and Limits ofRes Judicata andLis Pendens as Proce-
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tional law] which can impose order over the entire field so as to secure
unity in the overall development of the law," Judge Shahabuddeen has
written, "there is a legal duty [on judges] to take account of the need for
coherence in the whole field."' 168 Such judicial "self-organizing," it is
claimed, "is almost certainly a necessary precondition" of
"an interna169
tional judicial system that functions well in all situations."
But coherence, predictability, and order, though certainly desirable,
prioritize style over substance, form over outcome. 170 Most importantly,
coherence presupposes a legal system that contains adequate control
mechanisms. Without adequate control mechanisms, however, a wellregulated system will not be a well-subscribed system. Coherence is a
luxury afforded to us by control.
Further, competition and coherence are not necessarily in tension. It
is entirely possible that, after an initial period of competition in a particular substantive area, coherent rules will emerge,'17 and, indeed, this
has been the case in some areas of law.' 72 When coherent rules have not
emerged-such as with the law of State responsibility for the acts of irregular forces' 73 -it may be due, in fact, to the absence of effective
competition.
dural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlment Outcomes, 3 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 37 (2004); Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Consistency in Holdings by InternationalTribunals, in I LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 633 (Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney &
Rfldiger Wolfrum eds., 2002).
168. Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision,
25, 28 (May 31, 2000)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
169. Martinez, supra note 29, at 448. This is an empirical assertion, which is belied by the
historical record of competitive systems of adjudication and the existence in contemporary society of forms of competition among courts. See, e.g., Zywicki, supranote 138.
170. Some may also oppose competition precisely because it places limits on the autonomy of
the international judiciary. On this theory, autonomous courts are desirable because they more
effectively promote the international rule of law. This view is misplaced because it assumes that
States will sign up for such courts. A corollary fear is that competition among courts will lead to a
race to the bottom. But that is unlikely as that would undercut the usefulness of international adjudication to States and also because, as discussed previously, international judges are, on the
whole, part of a culture that would resist such tendencies.
171. Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazardin Forum Shopping:
ConflictsLaw as SpontaneousOrder,25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1391-92 (2004).
172. See, e.g., Charney, supranote 28, at 345.
173. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
145 (July 15, 1999)
(adopting an "overall control" test and rejecting the approach of the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)), with Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), General List No.91, 2007 I.C.J. _,
391, 406 (Feb. 26) (adhering to
the "effective control" test ofNicar v. U.S., supra, and refusing to follow the ICTY's Tadi decision).
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Finally, critics of competition confuse competition among courts to
attract litigants (competitive adjudication) with conflicts among courts
that may stem from multiple filings in different courts regarding the
same dispute (parallel proceedings). 174 It may be appropriate to restrict
parties to a dispute to a single filing in one jurisdiction, and consequently, it may be appropriate for courts to defer to another jurisdiction
where a case has already been filed. Indeed, treaties that allow for competitive adjudication usually also limit parties to a single filing in one
forum. 175 Thus, the potential problem of overlapping jurisdiction over
the same case is not a necessary result of (and consequently is not a
valid objection to) competitive adjudication.
If competition is the priority, then States and courts should think less
about "system-protective" devices and more about competitionenhancing techniques. In negotiating treaties, States should incorporate
dispute resolution provisions, like those in the UNCLOS, that provide a
choice of fora or create new fora. They should also publicly communicate their dissatisfaction with judicial decisions more often, as the Legal
Adviser of the U.S. Department of State did following a recent ICJ
judgment. 176 As Judge Meron has written: "Constructive criticism facili1 77
tates self-examination and self-improvement by the judiciary.'
Courts, for their part, should adopt doctrines that mediate the precedential effects of their own decisions1 78 and encourage the publication of
dissenting opinions. 179 They should also critically review and take into
account the decisions and practices of other courts.1 80 Indeed, instead of
striving for uniformity, we should accept and develop a system of competitive adjudication in international law.

174. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, PrivateRights andPublicInternationalLaw: Why Competition Among InternationalEconomic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2007). On parallel proceedings, see generally, for example, DOSSIERS: PARALLEL STATE
AND ARBITRAL PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Bernardo M. Cremades &
Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2005).
175. See, e.g., NAFTA, supranote 48, art. 2005(6).
176. See William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense andthe Oil Platforms Decision,29 YALE J. INT'L
L. 295 (2004).
177. Meron, supranote 12, at 368.
178. Cf Buergenthal, ProliferationofInternationalCourts, supranote 28, at 273.
179. Cf Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO DisputeSettlement, 9 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 895 (2006).
180. Cf Cheng, supra note 98, at 1049; Nathan Miller, An InternationalJurisprudence?The
Operationof "Precedent"Across InternationalTribunals, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 483 (2002).

